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Abstract 
Gender Development Index and Gender Empowerment Measure are two gender-based 
indicators provided by the United Nations Development Program.  Population share of the 
genders enter the formulation of these indicators in such a way that it favours the better 
performing gender. This can lead to further additions to ‘missing women’. A correction is 
proposed to capture this anomaly. This alternative satisfies an axiom of Monotonicity with its 
two corollaries, that is, given attainments the measure maximizes at ideal sex ratio and 
vanishes when one of the genders becomes extinct. An empirical illustration by taking life 
expectancy data of countries is given. 
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Gender-based Indicators in Human Development: 
Correcting for ‘Missing Women’ 
 
Hippu Salk Kristle Nathan 
 
1. Introduction 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) measures gender sensitive human 
development through two indicators, namely, Gender Development Index (GDI) and Gender 
Empowerment Measure (GEM). These indicators measure the overall achievement taking 
note of inequality between the two genders. GDI adjusts the average development, measured 
by Human Development Index (HDI), to reflect the gender inequalities in the three 
dimensions of health, education and ability to achieve a decent standard of living. GEM 
captures the inequalities in opportunities between men and women in the three dimensions of 
political participation, economic participation and power over economic resources. For each 
dimension of GDI and GEM, an equally distributed equivalent index, Xede is computed by 
combining female and male indices in a way that penalizes differences in achievement 
between the two genders.
2 The population-proportion of female and male enter into the 
formulation of Xede as weights to female and male achievements respectively, like the case of 
weighted mean. This follows that for a given level of female and male achievements, a rise in 
the population proportion of the gender with a higher level of achievement will result in 
higher  Xede. It leads to rewarding of countries having imbalanced population-proportion 
biased towards the higher performing gender as shown in the following example.  
The life expectancy indices of female and male for United Arab Emirates (UAE) are 
0.892 and 0.905 respectively, and that of United Kingdom (UK) are 0.895 and 0.903.
3 In 
terms of Xede of life expectancy, UAE and UK score 0.901 and 0.899 respectively and their 
ranks are 19 and 21 in the world.
4 This indicates both the countries are close to each other in 
terms of health dimension of GDI. However, in terms of population-proportion, male/female 
for UAE is 0.68/0.32 and that of UK is 0.49/0.51. In fact UAE, with more than two males for 
                                                 
2 For the expression of Xede, see Section 2 of this paper. The formula for female and male indices is: 
Index=(actual-minimum)/(maximum-minimum). 
3 Life expectancy index is computed by positing a minimum and maximum. The minimum and maximum values 
for life expectancy at birth (in years) for female are 27.5 and 87.5 and for male, the corresponding figures are 
82.5 and 22.5 respectively. 
4 The ranks for 173 countries, out of the total 177 countries listed in Human Development Report (HDR) 
2007/2008 (UNDP, 2007), are computed on the basis of Xede of life expectancy. Life expectancy data for four 
countries Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Seychelles are not available.    4
every female, has the most skewed sex ratio in the world. UK, on the contrary, has a balanced 
sex ratio. Also, the difference in life expectancy indices of female and male for UK is 0.008 
which is less than that of UAE, which is 0.013. Yet, UAE ends up fetching a better rank than 
UK. Instead of being penalized for imbalanced population-proportion, UAE gets rewarded as 
the imbalance favours male which has higher life expectancy. 
The UAE story repeats for countries like Quatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Saudi 
Arabia. Their imbalanced population-proportion acts to their advantage. This anomaly affects 
all equally distributed indices used in the measure different dimensions of GDI and GEM. 
These indices signal countries to favour the higher performing gender and neglect the gender 
which is lower in performance (typically female). This leads to further additions to ‘missing 
women’.
5 For example, a country, where female literacy is lower than male can improve its 
education dimension of GDI, by improving the male/female ratio; through female infanticide, 
abandonment of newborn girls, and neglect of daughters. So, as gender sensitive development 
indicators, the signal of GDI and GEM is counter intuitive. Ideally, these indicators should 
signal countries to correct their gender imbalances in population-proportion, rather than to 
distort it further. 
This paper revisits the gender-based indicators and proposes a correction so as to 
account for population-proportion of female and male in such a way that countries farther to 
the ideal sex ratio are penalized. An axiom of Monotonicity, with its two corollaries:  Ideality 
and Extinction, is posited to characterize the measure. To demonstrate the advantage of the 
proposed measure, equally distributed life expectancy index has been used.
6 The paper makes 
use of life expectancy data from the latest HDR (UNDP, 2007) and population data from 
United Nations (UN, 2008). 
 
2. Conventional measure 
For a pair of female and male achievements (Xf, Xm), equally distributed equivalent 
index, Xede is given by general formula  
Xede = [(pf (Xf)
(1-ε)+ pm(Xm)
(1-ε)]
1/(1-ε)  where ε≥0 & ε≠1;          
Xede = (Xf)
Pf (Xm)
Pm  for ε=1                           (1) 
                                                 
5 ‘Missing women’ is the term coined by Amartya Sen (Sen, 1992) to describe the terrible deficit of women in 
substantial part of Asia and North Africa due to sex bias in relative care. This term is used in the present paper 
as an analogy to describe disadvantaged gender which can be male as well. For instance, a country prone to war 
will have female life expectancy relatively higher due to decimation of men fighting war. 
6 The composite indices GDI and GEM are not recalculated here, as aggregated values will be inconclusive on 
the effect on individual dimensions.   5
where, pf and pm are proportion of female and male respectively such that pm+pf=1 and ε is the 
aversion to inequality. For moderate penalty, the value 2 is used for ε (UNDP, 2007). With 
ε=2, Xede
 is the harmonic mean of Xf and Xm, given by  





   (2) 
The properties of Xede are listed in Appendix 1.
7 Given (Xf, Xm), Xede varies between Xf 
to  Xm as pf,  pm vary. Fig.1 plots this variation, with Xf=0.3 and X m=0.8. A rise in the 
population proportion of the gender with higher level of achievement (here male, as Xm>Xf) 
results in higher Xede. The boundary conditions are at pm=0, Xede=Xf and at pm=1, Xede=Xm. All 
this is counter intuitive for a development indicator sensitive to gender. How can it boils 
down to the achievement of one gender when the other gets extinct! Does existence or 
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Fig. 1. Variation of Xede with population proportion (pm, pf) 
 
Since rise in the population proportion of higher performing gender leads to higher 
Xede, a country gets rewarded for deviation from the ideal sex ratio half of the time i.e. when 
                                                 
7 These properties are noted in Anand and Sen (2003), some in the text, and some in Appendices. For details of 
the proof of the properties, see the same paper. Here, they are collated together in a tabular form for comparison 
of the present measure with the proposed one.   6
the deviation favours the advantaged gender. The irony is that instead of being penalized for 
not able to protect the gender, a country maximizes its Xede when the lower performing 
gender gets extinct. So, Xede, and in turn the measures based on Xede do not signal countries to 
maintain population-proportion of female and male at a balanced state. The gulf countries, for 
instance, do not get any signal to have policies to balance their sex ratio. Rather they would 
prefer a more skewed sex ratio biased towards men, as it leads to higher value of Xede. The 
signal of conventional measure of Xede is: ‘more achievement, more proportion – the better’. 
The correct signal is: ‘more achievement, ideal proportion – the better’. The following 
section briefs on ideal proportions of female (pfi) and male (pmi) in human population. 
  
3. Ideal sex ratio for human population  
The actual average sex ratio of entire world population is 1.01 (UN, 2008).
8 However, 
the value of ideal sex ratio is under debate and may vary with regions and races. The sex ratio 
of a population depends on three factors: the sex ratio at birth, differential mortality rates 
between the sexes at different ages, and losses and gains through migration (Coale, 1991). In 
the absence of manipulation, the sex ratio at birth is remarkably consistent across human 
populations, at 1.05 to 1.07 (Coale, 1991, Campbell, 2001). Although sex ratio at birth favors 
males, differential gender mortality favors females (Teitelbaum, 1970; Sen, 1992, Waldron 
1993). Higher life expectancy in females tends to even out the sex ratio in adult population, 
with male excess among the young and female excess among the old (Klasen and Wink, 
2003). But, manipulation at birth manifested by sex-selective abortion, and neglect and 
abandonment of female children, and international migration characterized by shifting of 
male population affect sex-ratio. However, like other species, natural human sex ratio is 
approximately unity and deviation is a threat to the stability and security of the society (Zeng 
et al, 1993, Park and Cho, 2003, Hudson and Den Boer, 2004). For simplicity, unity sex ratio 
i.e. equal proportion of  female and male (pfi=pmi=0.5) is used in this paper for illustrations. 
 
4. Axiom of Monotonicity 
This section presents Monotonicity property that a measure of equally distributed 
equivalent achievement should satisfy with respect to sex ratio. 
                                                 
8 Sex ratio is expressed in this paper as (male population)/(female population)    7
Axiom of Monotonicity:
9 Given the achievement level of two genders, the equally 
distributed equivalent achievement, increases as population approaches to its ideal sex ratio. 
Mathematically, given Xf, Xm (0≤Xf ,Xm≤1), Xede increases as (pm/pf)→(pmi/pfi). Referring to 
Fig. 1, axiom of Monotonicity requires Xede to have a positive and negative slope for pm<pmi 
and  pm>pmi respectively. Two corollaries of Monotonicity are axioms of Ideality and 
Extinction. 
Axiom of Ideality: Given the achievement level of two genders, the equally 
distributed equivalent achievement maximizes at the ideal sex ratio. Mathematically, given 
Xf, Xm (0≤Xf ,Xm≤1), Xede=(Xede)max for (pm/pf)=(pmi/pfi). Referring to Fig. 1, axiom of Ideality 
requires Xede to maximize at ideal proportion of female and male (say pfi=pmi=0.5).
10 
Axiom of Extinction: Irrespective of achievement levels of two genders, if any of the 
genders goes extinct, the equally distributed equivalent achievement reduces to minimum 
possible value i.e. 0. Mathematically, for any Xf, Xm (0≤Xf ,Xm≤1) Xede=0 if pf=0 or pm=0.
 11 
Referring to Fig. 1, axiom of Ideality requires Xede to be 0 at points pm=0 and pm=1. 
 
5. Proposed measure 
The genesis of the weakness of the conventional measure lies with the absence of 
penalty for deviating from ideal sex ratio. The conventional measure does take note of 
inequality in the achievements of the two genders (i.e. between Xf and X m) in different 
dimensions like health, education; but inequality in proportion of population (i.e. between pf 
and p m) is not accounted.
12 Imposition of axiom of Monotonicity will make the measure 
sensitive to deviation from ideal sex ratio. Accordingly, a new measure of equally distributed 
equivalent achievement, 










Pm           for ε=1, θ≥0     (3) 
where p and pi are the actual and ideal proportion of that gender whose actual population is 
less than or equal to the ideal. The proposed measure is different from the conventional one 
in the first term, i.e. the penalty factor, which takes note of the deviation from ideal sex ratio. 
                                                 
9 Monotonicity, here means in a strong sense.    
10 It is not compulsory to assume pfi=pmi=0.5. The debate of ‘what should be the ideal sex ratio’ is out of the 
scope of the paper. However, axiom of Ideality simply says, Xede  must maximize at given ideal, pfi, pmi  
11In general, axiom of Extinction is applicable only to the gender whose ideal proportion of population is non 
zero. Let us consider a hypothetical specie having ideal population proportion for female and male as 1:0. Here 
pm=0 is the condition for Ideality, so Xede maximises. The axiom of Extinction is applicable only to female 
gender i.e. at pf=0 
12 Under the assumption of unity ideal sex ratio, deviation from ideal can be captured as difference of 
population-proportion of female and male.   8
The factor is powered by θ, which controls the aversion to this deviation. Larger the θ, 
smaller is the 
nXede.
13 At θ=0, 
nXede reduces to Xede showing no concern for deviation from 
ideal sex ratio. For θ>0, the penalty factor gets actuated. The axiom of Extinction gets 
satisfied for any θ>0. This signifies, once 
nXede is sensitive towards deviation from ideal sex 
ratio, howsoever small the sensitivity may be; it would reduce to zero if one of the genders 
goes extinct. This is rational, as any gender sensitive development indicator would penalize a 
society most severely where one of the genders could not survive in the first place, let alone 
develop. 
For a moderate penalty on gender inequality in achievement i.e.
 ε=2, the axiom of 
Monotonicity is satisfied for θ≥1.
14 So, for ε=2, 1 is the minimum value of θ for which 
Monotonicity with both of its corollaries are satisfied; hence 1 is chosen for θ. For ε=2 and 
θ=1, equation (3) reduces to 
nXede = [p/pi][(pf (Xf)
(-1)+ pm(Xm)
(-1)]
(-1)    (4) 
The propoerties of 
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Fig. 2. Variation of 
nXede with population proportion (pm, pf) 
 
                                                 




θln(p/pi). Since (p/pi)≤1, (∂(
nXede)/∂θ)≤0    











L   9
Fig. 2 plots 
nXede against pm and pf for same values of Xf and Xm as in Fig. 1 i.e. 
Xf=0.3, and Xm=0.8. 
nXede is 0 at exitnction conditions (pm=0 or pm=1) and maximizes at ideal 
sex ratio (pm/pf=pmi/pfi=0.5/0.5). The maximum value, (
nXede)max is the harmonic mean of 
Xf=0.3 and Xm=0.8, which coincides with the value of Xede at ideal sex ratio as the penalty 
factor reduces to 1. For pm<pmi the profile is represented by curve IA
C and for pm>pmi, curve 
IB
C
. The positive and negative slope of IA
C
 and IB
C respectively, validates the axiom of 
Monotonicity. The following propositions further characterize 
nXede. 
Proposition. The equally distributed equivalent achievement has a convex-decrease for fall 
in proportion of higher performing gender from ideal and a concave-decrease for lower 
performing gender.
15  
In Fig. 2, since Xm>Xf, IA
C
 and IB
C have convex and convex profiles respectively. The 
straight lines IA
L, IB
L represent the profile of 
nXede for fall in pm and pfi respectively under the 
condition of gender indistinguishability, i.e. both the genders are at same level of 
achievement, hence are not distinguishable from the achievement point of view. Substituting, 
Xf=Xm=X in Eq. (4) we get the linear relationship between 
nXede and population-proportion. 
nXede = [p/pi]X  (5) 
So, the common achievement X coincides with (
nXede)max. Under this condition of 
gender indistinguishability, for pmi=pfi, the profiles of 
nXede at both sides of ideal are 
symmetric. IA
L, IB
L are a pair of such symmetric lines corresponding to X=(0.48/1.1) i.e. 
harmonic mean of Xf=0.3 and Xm=0.8.  
IA
C is below IA
L and IB
C is above IB
L. At a given population-proportion, a shift from 
IA
L to IA
C indicate a movement from gender indistinguishability, where all the population are 
at common achievement level, to a state where less than the ideal share population move to 
higher achievement level and rest move to a lower achievement level. Hence the overall 
achievement will fall. In case of movement from IB
L to IB
C  more than the ideal share 
population move to higher achievement level leading to a improvement in overall 
achievement. This translates to the following lemma.
16 
Lemma 1. For any given population-proportion between ideality and extinction, when higher 
performing gender has more (less) share than ideal share, the equally distributed equivalent 
achievement is higher (lower) than the condition of gender indistinguishability.  
On the basis of the above lemma, for pfi=pmi, it is straight forward to show that for a 
given population-proportion the equally distributed equivalent achievement is higher when 
                                                 
15 Proof for ε=2, θ=1, is in Appendix 3 
16 Proof for ε=2, θ=1, is in Appendix 4   10
higher performing gender has more share than the case when the proportion is swapped 
between the two. Also, for pfi=pmi, magnitude wise the slope of IA
C is higher than that of IB
C 
at ideal. This is obvious from the fact that at equal population-proportion of two groups, fall 
of proportion of the higher quality group entails a greater loss to the society than the lower 
quality one. This leads to the following lemma. 
Lemma 2. For equal population-proportion of genders at ideal the equally distributed 
equivalent achievement decreases at a faster rate at ideal when population proportion falls 
for the higher performing gender than for the lower one.  For condition of gender 
indistinguishability, the rate of decrease lies in between.  
The proof of the above is straight forward from the fact that IA
C and IB
C are convex 
and concave respectively lying below and above of IA
L and IB
L which are symmetric under 
unity ideal sex ratio. 
  
6. Applying the new measure to equally distributed life expectancy index 
Taking female and male life expectancy data for countries of the year 2005 from HDR 
2007-2008 (UNDP 2007) and their population-proportion data from Population Division, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs of United Nations (UN, 2008) ranks of the 
countries are obtained on the basis of Xede and 
nXede (Appendix 5). A value of pmi=pfi=0.5 (i.e. 
sex ratio 1:1) is used for the purpose. The aversion parameters are taken as θ=1 and ε=2. The 
difference in ranks indicates that a negative (positive) value implies a worse (better) 
performance of the country with the proposed measure when compared with the conventional 
one. The last column is population-proportion difference expressed as female share of 
population to male share, a negative value showing where male share is higher. The countries 
those have lost rank under new measure are referred to as losers. Similarly, those that moved 
up in the ranks are referred to as gainers. Following are some observations. 
Table 1: Biggest Losers 





















Emirates   
0.892 0.905  2.137  19 129  -110  -0.363 
Qatar    0.805  0.868  2.064  41  134  -93  -0.347 
Kuwait    0.868  0.887  1.500  33  101  -68  -0.200 
Bahrain    0.825  0.857  1.323  43  93  -50  -0.139 
Oman    0.820  0.852  1.284  47  87  -40  -0.124 
Saudi Arabia    0.785  0.797  1.172  66  90  -24  -0.079 
   11
  The six gulf countries, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia; stand 
out as biggest looser as per the proposed measure of equally distributed life expectancy 
index. These six countries have the dubious distinction of world’s top rankers in terms of 
unbalanced sex ratio biased towards male. Table 1 illustrates their case. In all these countries, 
male life expectancy index is more than female. Since men outnumber women by large 
margins, these countries get the undue advantage under the conventional measure. In the new 
measure they lost rank because of the penalty for deviation from ideal sex ratio. 
Table 2: Some selected cases for comparison 




















Cuba    0.872  0.888  1.000  32  22  10  -0.001 
Kuwait    0.868  0.887  1.500  33  101  -68  -0.200 
Nicaragua    0.792  0.775  1.000  74  58  16  0.001 
Latvia    0.830  0.733  0.842  75  97  -22  0.085 
Iceland    0.927  0.957  1.000  3  1  2  0.000 
Japan    0.970  0.937  0.957  1  2  -1  0.023 
  
Table 2 gives a comparison between some selected gainers and losers. Cuba has less 
inequality in life expectancy for female and male than Kuwait. But Kuwait has managed to 
fetch a similar rank as Cuba because of its male biased sex ratio; so a higher weight of male 
performance contributing to the higher final value. However, under the new measure Cuba 
performed relatively better for its balanced sex ratio. Kuwait, on the contrary, having three 
males per two females lost its earlier rank by 68 positions. 
  It is not always true that men fared better than women. Male have a greater tendency 
to engage in risk behaviors and violence, thus increasing their risk of premature mortality 
(Waldron, 1993). Lativia is an example where not only females have more life expectancy, 
but also they are higher in population-proportion. This is the precise reason for which Lativia 
occupied a rank next to Nicaragua, which is much more equal in terms life expectancy across 
gender but also has a balanced sex ratio. Under the new measure, Lativia regresses to a lower 
rank on account of a biased sex ratio towards female, whereas Nicaragua improved its 
positions. 
  Japan tops the list under conventional measure, but when penalty for deviation from 
ideal sex ratio is introduced, Japan looses its rank to Iceland. As seen from the table Japan’s 
sex ratio is biased towards females (only 957 males for 1000 females) and females have 
higher life expectancy index. In fact, Japanese women live the longest in the world. However,   12
Japan got penalized under the new measure whereas Iceland, with equal proportion of males 
and females (1:1), does not get affected by the penalty. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The present gender equity-sensitive development indicators suffer from the limitation 
that countries with unbalanced sex ratio get rewarded where sex ratio is biased towards the 
higher performing gender. This paper questions the rationality of such indicators which take 
note of, for instance, inequality in life expectancy without consideration of the ‘life’ itself! 
An axiom of Monotonicity is posited so that equally distributed equivalent achievement 
increases as the population closes to ideal sex ratio. Two corollaries; axiom of Ideality and 
axiom of Extinction make the measure respectively to maximize at ideal sex ratio and to 
reduce to zero when one of the genders gets extinct. A new measure has been proposed which 
brings in a penalty factor to capture the deviation from ideal sex ratio. The new measure has a 
convex-decrease for fall in proportion of higher performing gender from ideal and a concave-
decrease for lower performing one. Under this proposed measure, gulf countries get penalized 
for their unnaturally unbalanced sex ratio biased towards male. Countries with higher level of 
achievement, lower disparity between male and female and population-proportion closer to 
ideal sex ratio get rewarded. Unlike the conventional measure, the new measure gives 
appropriate signal to countries to correct for the ‘Missing Women’.  The proposed measure is 
more flexible with different handles of aversion to proportion-inequality and achievement-
inequality. Though a uniform ideal sex ratio of 1:1 is used for the present analysis, the 
formulation is generic enough to consider different ideal sex ratios for different age group, 
countries, regions, and races. Moreover, the new measure can be used to find equally 
distributed equivalent achievement between two groups other than gender where a desired 
proportion of the two groups are postulated. For instance, the equally distributed equivalent 
index for education calculated for BPL (below poverty line) and APL (above poverty line) 
groups (note the desired population-proportion of BPL to APL is 0:1) using the proposed 
measure not only takes note of the inequality in achievement in education between the two 
gender, but also rewards a society who have higher proportion of people as APL However, 
the proposed measure is applicable to population of two groups. As a future scope, similar 
measures for more than two groups can be conceptualized.   13
Appendix 1 
Comparison of properties of conventional measure (Xede) and proposed measure (
nXede) 








=harmonic mean of Xf and Xm at pmi, pfi. This 
property qualifies the axiom of Ideality and 
Extinction. 
(ii) at ε=0, X ede=X
a i.e. arithmetic mean of 













(iii) larger the ε, smaller is Xede  (iii) larger the ε, smaller is Xede; larger θ 
smaller is Xede. 
(iv) Xede→ min(Xf, Xm) as ε→∞.
17 (iv) 
nXede→ [ p/pi]
θ[min(Xf, X m)] as ε→∞. 
When ε→∞ and p→pi; 
nXede→ min(Xf, Xm) 
(v)  Xede is monotonic increasing in both Xf  
and Xm, the increase is at diminishing rate.
18 
Property remains same for 
nXede. 
(vi) a unit increase in performance for the 
gender with higher population but lower 
level of performance is more valuable 
socially (higher Xede) than the unit increase in 
performance for the other gender. 
Property remains same for 
nXede. 
(vii) a rise in the population proportion of a 
sub group with higher level of achievement 
will result higher Xede. 
closer the proportion population to the ideal 
higher is 
nXede. This property validates axiom 
of Monotonicity. 
(viii) more concave the underlining form of 
Xede, smaller is Xede. The present underlining 
form of Xede is (1/(1- ε))X
(1-ε).  
Property remains same for 
nXede 
(ix) the relative gender equality index, E is 
maximum for Xf=Xm and max(E)=1.
19 
the relative gender equality index, E is 
maximum for Xf=Xm and max(E)= [p/pi]
θ. 
When p→pi; max(E)→1. 
(x) for equality of proportion, (pf=pm)  E  is 
symmetric in Xf and Xm. E →0, if (Xf/Xm)→0 
or (Xf /Xm)→ ∞. 
Property remains same for 
nXede 
 
                                                 
17 This resembles to Rawlsian maximin situation where achievement is judged purely by the achievement of the 
worst off group. 
18 The diminishing rate of increase is not valid for all concave functions; but for standard cases like constant 
relative inequality aversion (Xede = (1/(1-ε))X
(1-ε)) and constant absolute inequality aversion (Xede = -e
γx) (Anand 
and Sen, 2003) 
19 E = (Xede /X
a) is the ratio of the (1-ε) average to the arithmetic mean (AM). The result is intuitive as (1-ε) 
average of two numbers is same as AM only when the numbers are equal; in all other cases (1-ε) average < AM.    14
Appendix 2 





1/(1-ε)   for ε≥0,θ≥0 & ε≠1        (6) 
Note the above equation is valid for pm≤pmi. For pm>pmi the penalty term changes to 
[pf/pfi]
θ=[(1-pm)/(1-pmi)]
θ. To satisfy the axiom of Monotonicity we need to prove 
(∂(
nXede)/∂pm)>0 for pm≤pmi and (∂(
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for ε<1, Cm>0. So, for (∂(




























p   
for ε=0.5, pm=0.5, θ≥2; so θ should be at least 2 to satisfy the axiom of Monotonicity. 
for ε>1, Cf >0. So, for (∂(
nXede)/∂pm)>0, for all values of Xf, Xm, Cm ≥0, implies  
) 1 (
1
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for ε=2, θ≥1; so θ to be at least 1 to satisfy the axiom of Monotonicity for pm≤pmi. Similarly, 
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Differentiating with respect to pm  
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>0, the slope is convex. Similar proofs can be obtained for pm>pmi. 
 
Appendix 4 





 < [(pm/pmi)X] 
where X=Harmonic Mean of Xf and Xm at condition of Ideality pm= pmi, pf=pfi. Replacing the 
















The above inequality is true from property (vii) of Xede as mentioned in Appendix 1. Also this 
can be seen from Fig. 1 (in the text) where for pm<pmi, Xede increases with increase of pm. 
































Iceland    83.1  79.9  1.000  3  1  2  0.000 
Japan    85.7  78.7  0.955  1  2  -1  0.023 
Australia    83.3  78.5  0.976  5  3  2  0.012 
Sweden    82.7  78.3  0.985  7  4  3  0.008 
Canada    82.6  77.9  0.983  8  5  3  0.009 
Israel      82.3  78.1 0.979 10  6  4  0.011 
Spain    83.8  77.2  0.965  6  7  -1  0.018 
Norway    82.2  77.3  0.987  12  8  4  0.007 
Switzerland    83.7  78.5  0.939  4  9  -5  0.031 
Singapore    81.4  77.5  1.014  14  10  4  -0.007 
New Zealand    81.8  77.7  0.966  13  11  2  0.017 
Netherlands    81.4  76.9  0.986  16  12  4  0.007 
France    83.7  76.6  0.949  11  13  -2  0.026 
Hong Kong, China 
(SAR)    84.9  79.1  0.889  2  14  -12  0.059 
Italy    83.2  77.2  0.943  9  15  -6  0.029 
Malta      81.1  76.8 0.985 17  16  1  0.007 
Ireland    80.9  76.0  0.989  26  17  9  0.005 
Greece    80.9  76.7 0.977 24  18  6  0.012 
Austria    82.2  76.5  0.956  15  19  -4  0.022 
Belgium    81.8  75.8  0.963  23  20  3  0.019 
Germany      81.8  76.2 0.955 20  21 -1  0.023 
Cuba    79.8  75.8  1.002  32  22  10  -0.001 
Chile    81.3  75.3  0.979  28  23  5  0.011 
Korea (Republic of)    81.5  74.3  1.005  29  24  5  -0.003 
United Kingdom    81.2  76.7  0.955  21  25  -4  0.023 
Finland    82.0  75.6  0.959  22  26  -4  0.021 
Costa Rica    80.9  76.2  1.034  25  27  -2  -0.017 
Luxembourg    81.4  75.4  0.970  27  28  -1  0.015 
Cyprus    81.5  76.6  0.946  18  29  -11  0.028 
Denmark      80.1  75.5 0.980 31  30  1  0.010 
United States    80.4  75.2  0.968  30  31  -1  0.016 
Slovenia    81.1  73.6  0.953  35  32  3  0.024 
Portugal    80.9  74.5  0.935  34  33  1  0.033 
Albania    79.5  73.1  0.984  38  34  4  0.008 
Belize    79.1  73.1  1.015  39  35  4  -0.007 
Brunei Darussalam    79.3  74.6  1.078  36  36  0  -0.037 
Panama      77.8  72.7 1.018 46  37  9  -0.009 
Barbados    79.3  73.6  0.935  37  38  -1  0.033 
Ecuador    77.7  71.8  1.006  50  39  11  -0.003 
Czech Republic    79.1  72.7 0.949 40  40  0  0.026 
Mexico    78.0  73.1  0.956  44  41  3  0.023 
Uruguay    79.4  72.2  0.942  42  42  0  0.030 
Macedonia (TFYR)    76.3  71.4  0.996  53  43  10  0.002 
Argentina    78.6  71.1  0.957  49  44  5  0.022 
Viet Nam    75.7  71.9  0.998  54  45  9  0.001 
Poland    79.4  71.0  0.942  48  46  2  0.030 
Croatia    78.8  71.8  0.928  45  47  -2  0.037 
Syrian Arab Republic    75.5  71.8  1.013  57  48  9  -0.007 
Tunisia    75.6  71.5  1.015  58  49  9  -0.008 
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)    76.3  70.4  1.010  59  50  9  -0.005 
Bosnia and Herzegovina    77.1  71.8  0.945  51  51  0  0.028 
Malaysia    76.1  71.4  1.031  55  52  3  -0.015 
Slovakia    78.2  70.3  0.942  52  53  -1  0.030 
Saint Lucia    75.0  71.3  0.963  60  54  6  0.019 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya    76.3  71.1  1.066  56  55  1  -0.032 
Mauritius    75.8  69.1 0.986 68  56  12  0.007 
Occupied Palestinian 
Territories    74.4  71.3 1.035 62  57  5  -0.017 
Nicaragua    75.0  69.0  0.999  74  58  16  0.001 
Tonga    73.8  71.8  1.040  64  59  5  -0.020 
Colombia      76.0  68.7 0.977 69  60  9  0.012 























China    74.3  71.0  1.056  65  62  3  -0.027 
Bulgaria    76.4  69.2  0.939  63  63  0  0.031 
Algeria    73.0  70.4  1.018  79  64  15  -0.009 
Dominican Republic    74.8  68.6  1.019  78  65  13  -0.010 
Brazil    75.5  68.1  0.972  76  66  10  0.014 
Turkey      73.9  69.0 1.016 82  67  15  -0.008 
Bahamas    75.0  69.6  0.946  70  68  2  0.028 
Paraguay      73.4  69.2 1.015 83  69  14  -0.007 
Sri Lanka    75.6  67.9  1.033  77  70  7  -0.016 
Romania    75.6  68.4  0.951  73  71  2  0.025 
Philippines    73.3  68.9  1.014  86  72  14  -0.007 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines    73.2  69.0  0.983  87  73  14  0.008 
Hungary    77.0  68.8  0.909  61  74  -13  0.048 
Egypt    73.0  68.5  1.006  90  75  15  -0.003 
Lebanon    73.7  69.4  0.961  81  76  5  0.020 
Peru    73.3  68.2  1.011  89  77  12  -0.005 
El Salvador    74.3  68.2  0.967  84  78  6  0.017 
Morocco    72.7  68.3  0.988  93  79  14  0.006 
Jordan    73.8  70.3  1.082  72  80  -8  -0.039 
Indonesia    71.6  67.8  0.997  96  81  15  0.001 
Iran (Islamic Republic 
of)    71.8  68.7  1.029  94  82  12  -0.014 
uriname    73.0  66.4  0.996  97  83  14  0.002 
Lithuania    78.0  66.9  0.874  67  84  -17  0.067 
Samoa      74.2  67.8 1.079 88  85  3  -0.038 
Honduras    73.1  65.8  1.016  99  86  13  -0.008 
Oman    76.7  73.6  1.284  47  87  -40  -0.124 
Thailand    74.5  65.0  0.965  98  88  10  0.018 
Cape Verde    73.8  67.5  0.920  91  89  2  0.041 
Saudi Arabia    74.6  70.3  1.172  66  90  -24  -0.079 
Trinidad and Tobago   71.2  67.2  0.973  101  91  10  0.014 
Guatemala    73.2  66.2  0.950  95  92  3  0.025 
Bahrain    77.0  73.9  1.323  43  93  -50  -0.139 
Armenia    74.9  68.2  0.873  80  94  -14  0.068 
Vanuatu 71.3  67.5  1.038  100  95  5  -0.019 
Georgia    74.5  66.7  0.896  92  96  -4  0.055 
Latvia    77.3  66.5  0.843  75  97  -22  0.085 
Grenada    69.8  66.5  0.981  105  98  7  0.010 
Fiji    70.6  66.1  1.034  104  99  5  -0.017 
Estonia    76.8  65.5 0.851 85  100  -15  0.080 
Kuwait    79.6  75.7  1.500  33  101  -68  -0.200 
Uzbekistan    70.0  63.6  0.989  109  102  7  0.005 
Moldova    72.0  64.7  0.916  103  103  0  0.044 
Tajikistan    69.0  63.8  0.986  110  104  6  0.007 
Azerbaijan    70.8  63.5  0.943  107  105  2  0.029 
Maldives    67.6  66.6  1.056  108  106  2  -0.027 
Belarus    74.9  62.7  0.877  102  107  -5  0.065 
Mongolia    69.2  62.8  1.004  111  108  3  -0.002 
Kyrgyzstan    69.6  61.7  0.970  113  109  4  0.015 
Bolivia    66.9  62.6  0.993  118  110  8  0.003 
Sao Tome and Principe    66.7  63.0  0.987  116  111  5  0.006 
Ukraine    73.6  62.0  0.847  106  112  -6  0.083 
Bhutan    66.5  63.1  1.027  117  113  4  -0.013 
Kazakhstan    71.5  60.5  0.920  112  114  -2  0.042 
Comoros    66.3  62.0  1.005  120  115  5  -0.003 
Guyana    68.1  62.4  0.941  114  116  -2  0.031 
Pakistan    64.8  64.3  1.060  119  117  2  -0.029 
Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic    64.5 61.9  1.001  123  118  5  -0.001 
Mauritania    65.0  61.5  0.979  122  119  3  0.011 
India    65.3  62.3  1.052  121  120  1  -0.026 
Russian Federation    72.1  58.6  0.866  115  121  -6  0.072 
Bangladesh    64.0  62.3  1.045  124  122  2  -0.022 
Turkmenistan    67.0  58.5  0.970  126  123  3  0.015 























Senegal    64.4  60.4  0.968  127  125  2  0.016 
Solomon Islands    63.8  62.2  1.069  125  126  -1  -0.033 
Yemen    63.1  60.0  1.029  129  127  2  -0.014 
Myanmar    64.2  57.6  0.986  130  128  2  0.007 
United Arab Emirates    81.0  76.8  2.137  19  129  -110  -0.363 
Haiti    61.3  57.7  0.971 132  130  2 0.015 
Ghana    59.5  58.7  1.025  133  131  2  -0.012 
Gambia    59.9  57.7  0.983  134  132  2  0.009 
Timor-Leste    60.5  58.9  1.081  131  133  -2  -0.039 
Qatar  75.8  74.6 2.064 41  134  -93  -0.347 
Madagascar    60.1  56.7  0.990  135  135  0  0.005 
Togo    59.6  56.0  0.976  137  136  1  0.012 
Sudan    58.9  56.0  1.013  138  137  1  -0.007 
Cambodia    60.6  55.2  0.935  136  138  -2  0.033 
Papua New Guinea    60.1  54.3  1.064  139  139  0  -0.031 
Gabon    56.9  55.6  0.991  141  140  1  0.004 
Eritrea    59.0  54.0  0.964  140  141  -1  0.018 
Benin    56.5  54.1  1.016  143  142  1  -0.008 
Niger    54.9  56.7  1.046  142  143  -1  -0.023 
Guinea    56.4  53.2  1.051  144  144  0  -0.025 
Djibouti    55.2  52.6  0.997  146  145  1  0.001 
Congo    55.2  52.8  0.984  145  146  -1  0.008 
Mali    55.3  50.8  0.993  147  147  0  0.003 
Kenya    53.1  51.1  1.003  148  148  0  -0.001 
Ethiopia    53.1  50.5  0.990  149  149  0  0.005 
Namibia    52.2  50.9  0.983  150  150  0  0.008 
Burkina Faso    52.9  49.8  1.011  151  151  0  -0.005 
Tanzania (United 
Republic of)    52.0  50.0  0.990  152  152  0  0.005 
South Africa    52.0  49.5  0.965  153  153  0  0.018 
Chad    51.8  49.0  0.979  154  154  0  0.010 
Equatorial Guinea    51.6  49.1  0.980  155  155  0  0.010 
Cameroon    50.2  49.4  0.990  156  156  0  0.005 
Uganda    50.2  49.1  1.001  157  157  0  -0.001 
Burundi    49.8  47.1  0.954  158  158  0  0.024 
Botswana    48.4  47.6  0.965  159  159  0  0.018 
Côte d’Ivoire    48.3  46.5  1.034  160  160  0  -0.017 
Nigeria    47.1  46.0  1.024  161  161  0  -0.012 
Malawi    46.7  46.0  0.986  162  162  0  0.007 
Guinea-Bissau   47.5  44.2  0.976  163  163  0  0.012 
Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the)  47.1  44.4  0.984  164  164  0  0.008 
Rwanda 46.7  43.6  0.940  165  165  0  0.031 
Central African 
Republic  45.0 42.3  0.952  166  166  0  0.025 
Mozambique 43.6  42.0  0.938  167  167  0  0.032 
Sierra Leone  43.4  40.2  0.973  169  168  1  0.014 
Angola 43.3  40.1  0.973  170  169  1  0.014 
Lesotho 42.9  42.1  0.870  168  170  -2  0.070 
Zambia 40.6  40.3  1.003  173  171  2  -0.001 
Zimbabwe 40.2  41.4  0.984  172  172  0  0.008 
Swaziland    41.4  40.4  0.931  171  173  -2  0.036 
   19
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